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Answering the 
Mansfield question
 Labour’s proletariat problem
Craig Berry
Does Labour have a ‘Mansfield problem’? What, if 
anything, can the party do to reverse the deepening problem of 
working-class political disengagement? 
[Correction added on 25 September 2017, after Online and Print publication: Corrections have 
been made to the graph on p.129]
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The 2017 general election was peculiar for many reasons. One of  those reasons, relatively overlooked to date, is that – amid some stunning victories in affluent areas like Canterbury, Reading 
East, Warwick and Leamington, and Sheffield Hallam – the Labour 
Party lost the constituency of  Mansfield, a predominantly working-class 
town in Nottinghamshire. 
This article will focus on the deepening problem of  working-class political 
disengagement, and what, if  anything, Labour can do to reverse the trend. As 
someone from a traditional working-class background, the general election 
has brought to national prominence a set of  issues that – although I have 
rarely written about them – are central to my lived experience of  British 
politics. Alongside Mansfield, Labour’s losses in North East Derbyshire, 
Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland tell a similar story.
“...although Labour’s working-class support 
did rise in the 2017 election, it rose by far 
less than working-class support for the 
Conservatives”
Although I have never been anything other than acutely conscious of  
my class background, the topic of  class-based inequalities has played a 
remarkably small part in my professional life, despite a career that has 
taken in stints as a government and trade union official, as well as time 
spent in academia. Ironically, it has taken an apparent ‘surge’ of  electoral 
support for the most left-wing Labour leader of  my lifetime to force 
me to seriously question my view that Labour enjoyed the support of  
most working-class voters (albeit perhaps begrudging support) and that 
working-class conservatism, although ever-present, would only ever be a 
minority pursuit.
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It has of  course been obvious for a long time that this political imaginary 
is anachronistic; indeed, my own research interests in intergenerational and 
geographical inequalities reflect other faultlines in the politics of  inequality 
which are now severely fractured. I also think gender inequalities are as 
important as class inequalities, although they feature even less in my research.
However, until the 2017 election, there appeared to be no compelling reason 
to confront my class-centred view of  party politics. But although Labour’s 
working-class support did rise in the 2017 election, it rose by far less than 
working-class support for the Conservatives – a rapid acceleration of  a 
longer-run trend which Labour ignores at its peril, not least because it kept 
Theresa May in Number 10.
WORKING-CLASS POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT
Before the 2017 election, Labour had held Mansfield for 95 years (and it 
was actually first won by the party in 1918 – one of  a clutch of  new seats 
as the party won more than 50 constituencies for the first time). This is not 
to suggest that Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership is solely or even principally to 
blame for this particular loss. But there is no doubt that the Corbyn surge 
has changed the complexion of  Labour’s electoral base.
“...the Corbyn surge has changed the 
complexion of Labour’s electoral base”
Brexit is a crucial part of  this story. Mansfield’s support for leaving the EU 
in June 2016 was 70 per cent. But this archetypal ‘left behind’ town has 
been moving away from Labour for a very long time. Its directly-elected 
mayoralty has been held by ‘independent’ candidates since the post’s creation 
in 2002. The Mansfield Independent Forum – a centre-right grouping in all 
but name – is now the council’s largest party too, forming a cabinet with 
the support of  UKIP councillors. The Conservatives have also, generally 
speaking, been catching up to Labour at general elections since 1997.
The reasons for Mansfield’s abandonment of  Labour are obviously 
complex. But they are wrapped up in the fact that the constituency has 
one of  the highest concentrations of  working-class voters in England. 60 
per cent of  the residents of  the local authority area (coterminous to the 
constituency) are categorised as social grades C2 (skilled manual workers) 
or DE (semi-skilled, unskilled and unemployed), compared to an English 
average of  46 per cent.
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We can therefore see Labour’s loss of  Mansfield as part of  a long run 
national trend of  working class voters deserting the Labour Party. IpsosMori 
voting data shows C2 support steadily declining from around 50 per cent in 
1997 to 30 per cent in 2010, and DE support declining from around 60 per 
cent to around 40 per cent over the same period.7 After briefly appearing 
to further alienate working-class voters, Corbyn’s Labour recovered just 
enough working-class support by the 2017 election to allow many other 
Labour ‘heartland’ seats to be spared.
At the same time, working-class support for the Conservative Party has 
risen steadily across recent elections, now almost matching its early 1980s 
peak. As such, the Conservative Party now leads Labour among C2 voters 
by 4 percentage points, rising from an even share with Labour in 2015. And 
the Conservative Party has closed the gap among DE voters to 9 percentage 
points, having been 15 points behind in 2015.8
Labour picked up the working-class vote share too (benefiting from a 
collapse of  working-class support for the SNP and the Green Party9), but 
its surge was based mainly on a remarkable uptick in support among AB 
and C1 voters (managerial and professional workers). Incredibly, the spread 
of  support by class is now fairly even for both main parties.
“There is, however, a rather inconvenient 
truth which overrides this positive (or not-
quite-as-bad-as-it-seems) story about Labour’s 
working-class vote in 2017: turnout among 
working-class voters remains very low.”
The apparent silver lining for Labour in terms of  the party’s working-class 
base is that its vote share among young C2 and DE voters appears to have 
been particularly strong. Labour won 62 per cent of  the vote share among 
C2 voters aged 18–34 (compared to 27 per cent for the Conservatives), 
and 70 per cent for of  the DE vote in the same age group (compared to 
18 per cent for the Conservatives).
7  Bertram T (2016) ‘The Copeland test: Labour’s core vote’. https://medium.com/@theober-
tram/the-copeland-test-labours-core-vote-ddac4fb8ee 
8  Ipsos MORI (2017) ‘How Britain voted in the 2017 election’. https://www.ipsos.com/ip-
sos-mori/en-uk/how-britain-voted-2017-election?language_content_entity=en-uk 
9  See YouGov voting data: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/docu-
ment/owc2a5orpr/Establishment_Extra_Variables_Website.pdf  (2015) and  
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/smo1w49ph1/Internal-
Results_170613_2017Election_Demographics_W.pdf  (2017).
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There is, however, a rather inconvenient truth which overrides this positive (or 
not-quite-as-bad-as-it-seems) story about Labour’s working-class vote in 2017: 
turnout among working-class voters remains very low. While rising slightly, as 
it did across the electorate in general, C2 turnout was only 60 per cent in 2017, 
and DE turnout was only 53 per cent (the overall figure was 63 per cent, while 
AB and C1 voters both have a turnout rate close to 70 per cent).
Furthermore, turnout among working-class young people is depressingly 
low. C2 turnout in 2017 among voters aged 18–34 was only 49 per cent, 
and DE turnout was only 35 per cent (young C1 turnout, in contrast, was 
above the overall turnout rate for all ages). Here is the IpsosMori voting data 
by class and age with non-voters included:
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There are limitations to the Market Research Society’s ABCDE social grade 
classification, especially given that deindustrialisation has blurred the lines 
between white-collar and blue-collar occupations (particularly at the C1/C2 
boundary). There is also clearly a significant divide (racialised, in part) 
between people in working-class occupations in large cities, and those in 
smaller cities and towns like Mansfield.
The most important response to these concerns from a social scientist’s 
perspective is that this is the best available data. Indeed, research by polling 
companies using the ABCDE framework produces the only form of  data 
which explicitly connects voting behaviour to a classification of  social class. 
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It is imperative that the baby is not thrown out the bathwater. We should 
not mistake a lack of  exactitude with a lack of  usefulness – and we should 
be wary of  political leaders exploiting niche espistemological debates to 
unpick the validity of  evidence they do not like. The ABCDE categories 
remain useful; for instance, areas with a high proportion of  C2DE residents 
correlate closely with areas of  high deprivation.10
It is possible to conclude that the Conservatives are now a party with strong 
working-class support and that Labour is recovering lost ground among 
its working-class base. Elements of  both stories are apparent from the 
evidence – but more evidence is needed. The most important (and least 
refutable) story emerging from the 2017 general election in this regard, 
however, is that the working class remains disproportionately disengaged 
from formal politics. This disengagement is particularly acute among young 
people. Precisely because the ABCDE framework is imperfect, very little 
can be inferred from Labour’s DE vote share among the proportion of  the 
18–34 age group that voted. The only fact that really matters is that two-
thirds of  this group did not vote.
“...very little can be inferred from Labour’s 
DE vote share among the proportion of the 
18–34 age group that voted. The only fact that 
really matters is that two-thirds of this group 
did not vote”
THE MANSFIELD TEST
There is nothing wrong with Labour attracting more middle-class votes. The 
party needs to forge alliances across socio-economic groups to win a majority 
in parliament. Yet a celebration of  the unexpected but commendable feat 
of  gaining 30 seats must at some point give way to consideration of  how a 
further 64 seats will be gained to secure a parliamentary majority.
The Conservative Party’s own surge among working-class voters contributed 
to its enormous 42.4 per cent overall vote share. This was, incredibly, 
almost matched by Labour, but the Conservative vote is more evenly 
10  See social grade and deprivation data available, respectively: https://www.ons.gov.uk/
file?uri=/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/da-
tasets/2011censusquickstatisticsforenglandandwalesonnationalidentitypassportsheldandcoun-
tryofbirth/r24ewrttableqs611ewladv1_tcm77-304378%282%29.xls and https://www.gov.uk/
government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2015.
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spread, enabling the party to emerge as the largest party by a considerable 
margin. Of  course, there are relatively few constituencies like Mansfield, so 
it would be wrong to assume that reinforcing the party’s appeal to working-
class voters in ‘left behind’ towns would produce a stable majority for the 
Conservatives at the next election.
However, this argument is a bit of  a red herring. The first-past-the-post 
system means that the Conservative Party does not need to win all of  the 
predominantly working-class constituencies competed over by Labour and 
UKIP at the 2015 election, for instance, to win a majority. A handful of  
Mansfields would help, but the more important goal for the Conservative 
Party is winning back its own supporters in suburban areas. This is far more 
achievable as long as the working-class vote in these areas remains depressed.
If  a new Conservative leader can combine some of  the more appealing 
elements of  Mayism with a dash of  Osbornomics, the class alliance 
underpinning the approach to statecraft emerging under Theresa May 
might start to look a little more robust. A housing market stimulus which 
benefits younger as well as older people – both requiring and signifying 
a softening of  austerity – in combination with a new system of  higher 
education funding would probably do the trick.
“If a new Conservative leader can combine 
some of the more appealing elements of 
Mayism with a dash of Osbornomics, the 
class alliance underpinning the approach 
to statecraft emerging under Theresa May 
might start to look a little more robust”
Labour’s support in large cities – much prized by Cameron and Osborne – 
seems to have been strengthened by Corbynism (Sheffield was in fact the 
only city in England and Wales which delivered a swing to the Conservatives 
at the election11). But May’s alternative emphasis on smaller cities and 
towns has started to bear fruit. Ironically, the metro-mayoral offices – the 
creation of  which was central to Osborne’s metropolitan strategy – in the 
West Midlands and West of  England were only won by the Conservatives 
because of  support attracted by the party outside the regions’ core cities.
Labour performed well at the 2017 election largely because of  middle-
11  Breach A (2017) ‘The swinging cities’, Centre for Cities, 15 June. http://www.centreforcities.
org/blog/the-swinging-cities/ 
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class urban-dwellers. But the next election will probably be fought on 
very different territory. Unless the working- class vote can be decisively 
won (including mobilising the politically disengaged), the fragility of  the 
electoral coalition cobbled together by Corbyn could be exposed. Indeed, 
given the likelihood that Labour’s success in retaining the vast majority of  its 
predominantly working-class seats in 2017 can be at least partially explained 
by a habitual Labour-despite-Corbyn vote, which will be impossible to 
retain now the leader’s position is unassailable, a re-examination of  the 
party’s relationship with its base is critical.
LABOUR’S WORKING-CLASS WOBBLES
There appear to be four main treatments of  the working class in the centre-
Left imaginary. The first is that there are increasingly few differences 
between working- and middle-class interests. Labour figures are of  course 
correct to point out that working- and middle-class interests may be in far 
stronger alignment during a period of  labour market ‘hollowing out’ than is 
normally assumed, and we may indeed be witnessing a ‘proletarianisation’ of  
the economic experience of  some middle-class groups, particularly among 
the young. Such conclusions contribute to concerns around the sanctity of  
the ABCDE social grade classification.
“We may indeed be witnessing a 
‘proletarianisation’ of the economic 
experience of some middle-class groups, 
particularly among the young”
But economic precariousness is, overwhelmingly, an affliction of  the traditional 
working class. The broader charge of  Labour’s ‘embourgeoisement’, an 
accusation made most forcefully by John Gray,12 is unfair and simplistic, but 
the over-amplification of  middle-class precariousness among Corbynism’s 
softer, left-liberal wing is undoubtedly related to the under-representation 
of  working-class people among the party elite.
The reaction to Jeremy Corbyn’s appearance on the main stage at 
Glastonburyn – a music festival which attracts a predominantly middle-class 
audience – underlines this point. It is too crude to suggest that working-
class people do not attend events like Glastonbury. But it is equally absurd 
12  Gray J (2017) ‘Labour’s populism for the middle classes’, New Statesman, 18 June.  
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2017/06/labours-populism-middle-classes 
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to suggest that Glastonbury is a cross-class gathering because working-class 
people can ‘save up’ to afford the expensive tickets,13 or that many attend 
as volunteer bar workers. I did both of  these things, when I was poor, so 
that I could attend concerts and festivals. But the vast majority of  working-
class people have very limited access to cultural goods like Glastonbury. 
Some bemoan this fact, and some are entirely indifferent. There are as many 
working-class lifestyles as there are working-class people.
A second treatment of  the working class evident among Corbyn supporters 
involves recognition of  working-class opposition to Corbynism, explained 
via a pseudo-Marxist false consciousness thesis, in which the working 
class are deemed incapable of  understanding their own socio-economic 
interests. One of  the corollaries of  this sentiment is a predilection to 
portray the present moment as a historical juncture; that is, an interregnum 
between distinct historical periods. This provides a comforting frame 
for Corbynism, since it compels an immediate mobilisation of  socialist 
forces, irrespective of  working-class support, in order to capitalise on a 
weakening of  neoliberal normativity.14
“In practice, the experience of capitalism 
by working class groups has always been 
heavily politicised, but manifests as 
an interest in both liberation from and 
reproduction of their class status”
In practice, the experience of  capitalism by working class groups has always 
been heavily politicised, but manifests as an interest in both liberation 
from and reproduction of  their class status. For working-class people, this 
contradiction is not a theoretical problematique, but rather a crushing, 
everyday dilemma.
This is not to deny that history develops via junctures at which a multitude 
of  futures are imaginable, and at which failed futures – such as those which 
13  Jones O (2017) ‘Glastonbury is more evidence: Corbyn’s appeal crosses classes, The Guardian, 
26 June. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jun/26/labour-jeremy-cor-
byn-middle-working-class-glastonbury 
14  Both of  these arguments are present in the work of  cultural theorist Jeremy Gilbert. See: 
Gilbert, Jeremy (2015) ‘Captive creativity: breaking free from the long 90s’, paper presented at 
University of  Leeds, September (https://jeremygilbertwriting.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/
the-end-of-the-long-90s1.pdf) and Gilbert, Jeremy (2017) ‘A response to Paul Mason’s “La-
bour: the way ahead”’ (https://jeremygilbertwriting.wordpress.com/2016/08/01/a-response-
to-paul-masons-labour-the-way-ahead/). 
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did not materialise after the crisis of  the 1970s, before the ascendance of  
neoliberalism – can be romanticised and revived. But the notion that we 
can identify a juncture as we live through it, immediately understanding 
its historical implications and imperatives for praxis, is fallacious. The 
conjunctural nature of  the present moment is obviously one of  the reasons 
for Corbyn’s popularity on the Labour left, eventually transmitted to key 
sections of  the electorate. But to move from this recognition to the argument 
that Corbynism itself  represents a progressive future – irrespective of  the 
content of  Labour’s policy programme, or the nature of  the class forces 
underpinning it – is too great a leap.
Among those opposed to Corbyn’s leadership, the only serious thinking about 
the proletariat problem within the Labour Party in the last few years has come 
from the Blue Labour perspective. Alas, ‘serious’ is by no means synonymous 
with ‘sensible’ in this context. What started out an important critique of  
New Labour’s managerialist state, inspired by communitarian thought, has 
morphed into self-parody as the very essence of  social democratic statecraft 
– collective action to pursue universal values – is deemed incompatible with 
community-building. Blue Labour replaces the class politics of  inequality 
with the class politics of  culture, and too eagerly apotheosises the image of  
the white, English manual worker as the key agent of  the socialist imaginary, 
while depriving this agent of  their experience of  exploitative economic 
relations and instead fetishising their experience of  place and ‘belonging’.15 
“Corbyn and McDonnell have begun to 
adopt a populist and conspiratorial tone 
on the economy, offering a ‘personalised’ 
critique of global elites”
The fourth treatment is increasingly being employed by Corbyn himself, 
alongside shadow chancellor John McDonnell. Corbyn and McDonnell 
have begun to adopt a populist and conspiratorial tone on the economy, 
offering a ‘personalised’ critique of  global elites for creating a ‘rigged’ 
economy, and committing to end freedom of  movement as part of  the 
Brexit process.16 We should, on the one hand, credit Corbyn et al for 
appearing to take seriously the need to appeal to the working class, and for 
15  Berry C (2015) ‘Resurrected right, disorientated left: pre-crisis economics and post-crisis 
emotions’, Juncture 22(3), 235-242.
16  Bolton M (2017) ‘Reassessing Corbynism: success, contradictions and a difficult path ahead’, 
SPERI Comment, 13 June. http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2017/06/13/reassessing-corbynism-suc-
cess-contradictions-and-a-difficult-path-ahead/ 
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seeking to politicise the distinctive nature of  working-class experiences in 
some areas. In this regard, Jeremy Corbyn is no Corbynite.
On the other hand, however, there are as yet no meaningful examples in 
history of  left-wing populism transforming, once power is attained, into a 
substantive, progressive and inclusive programme of  social change. I have 
my doubts that Labour’s accidental leader is about to set a trend in this 
regard. There is little evidence that populist rhetoric will ‘cut through’ to the 
working class, and certainly not without feeding a xenophobia from which 
only the Right will benefit. In practice, Corbyn’s left-wing populism is more 
a performance for his own supporters than a genuine attempt to mobilise 
working-class groups.
“...there are as yet no meaningful 
examples in history of left-wing populism 
transforming, once power is attained, into 
a substantive, progressive and inclusive 
programme of social change”
A NEW SETTLEMENT
We should be pleased, therefore, that Corbyn’s populist turn remains at 
the embryonic stage. For the most part, Labour seems trapped between 
two equally absurd positions on its working-class base: either that the 
working class is a homogenous, apolitical lump for which Labour must craft 
a distinctive offer, or that there are increasingly few differences between 
middle- and working-class politics.
Clearly, the Conservative government has acute vulnerabilities of  its 
own making, as its future failures in terms of  the Brexit process create 
opportunities for Labour. But Labour will continue to struggle to develop 
a coherent perspective on Brexit until the party reacquaints itself  with the 
working class.
Corbyn is not responsible for the acquaintance having been lost, but it is 
essential that action is taken now to resolve the problem. Labour needs 
a policy offer for the working class which extends beyond increasing the 
minimum wage by slightly more than the Conservative Party is planning. 
The party needs a radical approach to social security and employment 
rights. The leadership also needs to make a determined effort to elevate 
people from working-class backgrounds to the highest ranks of  the party.
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The party itself  must reform. A decisive shift of  internal culture is needed: 
away from members debating policies among themselves, and towards 
genuine deliberation with working-class communities. Structural change – 
such as the comprehensive federalisation of  the party within England – 
would assist this agenda. There is also work to be done by the trade union 
movement. Trade unions should become more important to Labour, but 
only on the basis that they become more representative of  the working 
class. If  existing unions are reluctant to change, Labour must support and 
drive the creation of  new forms of  trade unionism.
“A decisive shift of internal culture is needed: 
away from members debating policies among 
themselves, and towards genuine deliberation 
with working-class communities”
Labour stands at a critical juncture. The stubbornness (and exacerbation) of  
class-based inequalities shatters the illusion upon which much of  Labour’s 
recent statecraft has been founded. But while the party’s shift leftwards 
clearly offers an opportunity to re-root Labour in the working class – while 
acknowledging its complexities – there are few signs at present that this 
opportunity is being realised.
Craig Berry is deputy director of  SPERI, the Sheffield Political 
Economy Research Institute at the University of  Sheffield.
